Colombia’s major guerrilla factions, including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the FARC, have announced temporary ceasefires ahead of the upcoming presidential elections. This tactical pause is framed by the groups as a gesture of goodwill to allow citizens to vote without fear of violence. However, this temporary suspension of hostilities is less about democratic altruism and more about strategic positioning, territorial consolidation, and forcing the hand of the next administration. For the communities living under the shadow of these armed groups, a few days of quiet will not change the deep-seated reality of coercion and control.
To understand why these ceasefires are declared, one must look past the official communiqués broadcast on clandestine radio stations and social media channels.
Armed groups in Colombia do not operate in a vacuum. They are highly sophisticated political and military organizations that view elections not as a democratic celebration to protect, but as an opportunity to exert leverage. By temporarily halting offensive actions, the ELN and FARC dissidents present themselves as disciplined, unified structures capable of enforcing a top-down command. It is a display of sovereignty intended for the eyes of Bogotá and international observers.
The timing is deliberate. A ceasefire during a high-stakes presidential election guarantees maximum media coverage. It allows the groups to dominate the news cycle, framing themselves as necessary partners in any future peace talks. This is a well-worn playbook in Colombian history. For decades, insurgent groups have used the electoral calendar to test the waters, signal their willingness to negotiate, or deliberately sabotage candidates who take an uncompromising line against them.
The Fragmented Reality of Modern Insurgency
The current security situation in Colombia is vastly different from the conflict of the late twentieth century.
The 2016 peace accord with the main body of the FARC was supposed to close a chapter on decades of civil war. Instead, it fractured the criminal market. The vacuum left by demobilized fighters was quickly contested by the ELN, newly formed FARC dissident structures like the Segunda Marquetalia and the Estado Mayor Central, and powerful drug trafficking syndicates like the Clan del Golfo.
Because of this fragmentation, an election ceasefire declared by one group rarely translates to actual safety on the ground. While the ELN may order its fronts to stand down, a rival dissident faction or a neo-paramilitary cartel may use that exact moment to launch an offensive to seize lucrative coca-growing valleys or strategic river corridors. The borders of control are fluid and written in blood.
Furthermore, the internal cohesion of these groups is highly questionable. The ELN operates more like a federation of semi-autonomous fronts than a strictly hierarchical military organization. The Western War Front in Chocó or the Eastern Front along the Venezuelan border frequently ignore directives from the central command in Cuba or Venezuela if those directives interfere with local financial interests, which are heavily tied to cocaine production and illegal gold mining. A ceasefire ordered by the leadership is often ignored by mid-level commanders who cannot afford to let their guard down against local rivals.
Coercion by Other Means
A ceasefire does not mean an armed group stops controlling a population.
Violence in Colombia is often subtle, structural, and quiet. Long before election day, commanders establish the parameters of acceptable political behavior in the regions they dominate. They do not need to detonate roadside bombs or engage the army in firefights during the week of voting because the rules have already been made clear to local mayors, community councils, and voters.
In many rural municipalities, local leaders are told explicitly which candidates are permitted to campaign and which are banned from entering the territory. Voters know that while the rifles might be lowered for forty-eight hours, those same rifles will be cleaned and reloaded the moment the ballots are counted. The threat of future retaliation is just as effective at shaping an election outcome as active intimidation on the day of the vote.
This dynamic creates a profound distortion of the democratic process. Candidates who advocate for hardline security measures or the forced eradication of coca crops are effectively locked out of campaigning in vast swaths of the country. Conversely, candidates who hint at broad concessions, sweeping land reforms, or the legalization of illicit economies find a much easier path through rebel-held territory. The ceasefire is the velvet glove that covers the iron fist of electoral engineering.
The Mirage of Humanitarian Gestures
The international community routinely lauds these temporary ceasefires as positive steps toward conflict resolution. United Nations observers and European diplomats issue statements expressing hope that these pauses can be converted into permanent agreements.
This optimism is routinely misplaced. Historical precedent shows that temporary ceasefires are frequently used by armed groups to rest their fighters, replenish ammunition stocks, and reorganize their intelligence networks. Moving troops and supplies through contested corridors is significantly easier when the Colombian armed forces are ordered to hold their positions to avoid provoking an incident that could derail the political optics of the moment.
The state itself faces a structural dilemma during these periods. If the military aggressively pursues a group that has declared a ceasefire, the government risks being branded as the peace-breaker by domestic political opponents and international human rights organizations. If the military stands down, it effectively cedes sovereignty and allows criminal economies to flourish unimpeded for weeks. It is a lose-lose proposition for the Ministry of Defense.
What Follows the Ballots
The true test of these announcements always occurs in the weeks following the inauguration of a new president.
The incoming administration will face an immediate choice: accept the terms of engagement dictated by these armed groups and initiate formal dialogues, or launch a renewed military offensive to reclaim lost territory. The rebels use the election ceasefire as a baseline for future negotiations, essentially arguing that their ability to halt violence proves their legitimacy as a political interlocutor.
For the average Colombian living in Catatumbo, Putumayo, or the Pacific coast, these national political maneuvers offer cold comfort. They understand that peace is not something that can be turned on and off like a faucet to coincide with an election cycle. True security requires the permanent presence of the state—not just soldiers, but judges, teachers, doctors, and infrastructure. Until Bogotá bridges the vast chasm between its urban centers and its forgotten peripheries, election ceasefires will remain a hollow theatrical performance staged for political gain.
